Abstract With European soccer leagues in mind, a novel model of club owner objectives nests standard profit (and win) maximization, but adds benefactor behaviour where owners inject personal funds to increase their team's quality. A "generosity" parameter differentiates owners; parameter value zero equates to profit maximizers, with benefactors emerging at sufficiently positive values. The model is used to investigate consequences of UEFA's "Financial Fair Play" regulations (FFP) for the league, aimed to preclude benefactor injections. Assuming (post-Bosman) a relatively large elasticity of talent supply to the league, FFP is a poor regulatory device, creating welfare losses for fans, owners and players.
INTRODUCTION
Benefactor ownership of a club in a professional sports league (alternatively "sugardaddy ownership" in Lang et al. (2011) ) is taken here to mean that the club owners are willing to inject their own funds into the club so as to increase expenditure on playing talent and the resulting team quality. The various national European soccer leagues seem to offer a number of examples, the best-known apparent such cases currently being Roman Abramovich at Chelsea and Sheikh Mansour at Manchester City in the English Premier League (EPL). Such willing (and presumably benefactor utility enhancing) injections of funds have however been seen as the source of problems for the soccer industry. Indeed UEFA has recently drawn up "Financial Fair Play" (FFP) regulations whereby clubs must expend on players no more than their soccer-related revenue, effectively precluding such benefactor fund injections (UEFA (2010a,b) ); failure to comply by any club that is successful enough in their own national league to qualify for one of UEFA's European level club competitions will lead to exclusion from that competition. In addition, it has been suggested to the recent UK Parliamentary enquiry into UK soccer governance that FFP might be imposed systematically on all clubs in the EPL, and the issue is still under ongoing discussion in the media and amongst owners 1 .
The paper presents a simplified but quite novel economic model of a sports league which, under laissez-faire, leads to benefactor behaviour by some owners. The model determines endogenously owner injections of funds, team qualities, match ticket prices for fans, and player salaries, plus the utilities accruing to fans, owners and players. The impact on these endogenous variables of the introduction of FFP can then be traced, allowing an evaluation of this regulatory policy. The central finding is clear and decidedly negative for FFP -if the supply of playing talent to the league is sufficiently elastic (as may be most plausible in the post-Bosman European soccer context), imposition of FFP makes all parties (fans, owners and players) worse off, primarily because of the adverse impact it has on all team and league qualities.
The major modelling innovation provided by the paper is its specification of owner objectives, which nests as special cases the objectives of profit maximization and win maximization that have been the focus of most existing literature on sports leagues, and which also brings in the possibility of benefactor behaviour with owners injecting their own funds to increase team quality. Of the benefactor motives suggested by Franck (2010) , that assumed here is a pure selfish consumption motive, perhaps analogous to race horse ownership (Franck (2010, p.117) ). Just as race horse ownership offers negative financial benefits (Gamrat and Sauer (2000) , DeGennaro (2003) ), and ownership may be motivated by a consumption benefit (the thrill of the race day experience, the enjoyment of seeing your horse win, particularly in an exciting, high quality champion race…), so too perhaps with ownership of a soccer club. The exact specification 2 assumes that owner consumption benefits depend on relative and absolute team qualities (similar to fan utility, as discussed below), but vary across owners via a "generosity" parameter. When this parameter is large benefactor behaviour emerges with positive fund injections. For European soccer, win maximization is the most common club objective assumed in previous literature (see, for instance, Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009), Kesenne (2007a,b) , Madden (2012) , Madden and Robinson (2012) ), whereby clubs aim to maximize team quality subject to a zero profit budget constraint, and such behaviour (with zero injections) also appears here at a critical lower value of the generosity parameter. For lower still values of this parameter, owners start to take profits out of the club ("profit takers", with negative injections), reaching standard profit maximizing behaviour when the parameter is zero and the owner gets no consumption benefit from ownership. The paper thus provides a rich and generalised set of leagues characterised by this range of (possibly hybrid) owner behaviour, brought to bear here on the FFP issue, but of potentially much wider application.
Other fundamentals of the model, and the equilibrium concept used, also embody some novel features that are worthy of immediate note. First, in European soccer (particularly since the Bosman ruling) the national leagues have engaged in fierce inter-league competition for playing talent. A number of economic models (e.g. Dietl et al. (2009) , Lang et al. (2011) , Madden (2012) , Madden and Robinson (2012) ) have addressed varying aspects of this European context by focusing on a single league, and capturing the fierce talent competition by assuming a perfectly (infinitely) elastic supply of talent to the league at an exogenous wage per unit of talent. Whilst this assumption does capture the fierce talent competition in an extreme way, it does preclude any inflation/deflation of individual player salaries because of the fixed wage per unit of talent. So, whilst our focus is also on a single league in the European spectrum (e.g. the EPL), we generalize the elasticity assumption to allow large but finite elasticity of talent supply, capturing the post-Bosman world in a more realistic way, and bringing player salary changes onto the agenda.
Secondly, as usual, clubs have disjoint sets of fans (their "fanbases") whose utility depends on the relative quality of their team compared to rivals; in addition this utility is also a function of absolute team qualities. The dependence is such that fans would divide a given amount of talent between themselves and rivals in a way that favoured their own team to some extent, but not too much, otherwise games become too onesided -there is some preference for uncertainty of outcome. More importantly the specification assumes that increases in away team quality (ceteris paribus) are a good thing for home fans, to produce the implied and empirically observed positive effect of away team quality on home attendance (Buraimo and Simmons (2008) ).
Finally, as usual, clubs are in competition for the supply of talent to the league, and have monopoly power over their fanbase in match ticket sales. However, it is explicitly assumed here that the number of clubs is "large", so that strategic interactions between individual clubs in the talent market can be ignored, and individual clubs cannot influence the wage per unit of talent. Madden (2011) discusses the modelling of sports leagues when numbers are not large in this sense, and game-theoretic equilibrium concepts are needed. Instead we bypass this necessity, justifying perfect competition in the talent market directly by the large numbers. The reason for the large league assumption is simply that it facilitates derivations in the imperfect elastic talent supply case, compared to the game-theoretic alternative.
Section 2 sets out in detail the fundamentals of the model, as outlined above. Section 3 analyses league equilibrium under laissez-faire, and Section 4 derives the negative consequences of FFP. Section 5 offers further discussion of the model and its results, including the large league (and its equilibrium) concept in Section 5.1, the likely impact of broadcasting income in Section 5.2, some consequences of inelastic talent supply (instead of the assumed high elasticity) in Section 5.3, and some empirical issues arising in Section 5.4. Section 6 concludes.
THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK
The fundamentals 3 of the model are: (1) the set of clubs in the league; (2) the supply of talent to the league; (3) the utility functions of fans; (4) the objective functions of club owners. This section describes the assumptions on fundamentals, and derives some of their consequences, before introducing the solution (league equilibrium) concept used, in Section 3 for laissez-faire and in Section 4 for FFP. Madden (2011) argued for a "strategic market game" equilibrium concept if the numbers of clubs is sufficiently small that strategic interactions between individual clubs cannot be ignored, and referred to an alternative "large league" equilibrium concept 4 for the setting where club numbers are sufficiently large that strategic interactions between individual clubs can be ignored. For tractability reasons this paper takes the large league route, initiated in the next subsection, and discussed further in Section 5.1.
Clubs
The league consists of an exogenously given set of clubs, whose teams play each other over the season with home and away games in stadiums of capacity large enough so as to be never binding on match attendance, and we abstract from stadium costs as is usual in the literature. To capture the large league we follow the standard microeconomics procedure and idealise with the assumption that there is a continuum of clubs of 2 types, with a mass of size 1 of each type 2 , 1 = i , rather than the common 2 club assumption; type 1 clubs will be "big market clubs", in a sense to be made precise below. Each club has an owner, referred to in the singular, although this is inessential.
Talent supply
On the input side the supply of playing talent to the league, ) (w S , is constant elastic,
, where w denotes the price of a unit of playing talent, so the talent supply curve is vertical at quantity 1 if 0 = ε , horizontal at wage 1 if ∞ = ε , and upward sloping through the (wage, quantity) points (0,0) and (1,1) otherwise. As remarked in the introduction, we are thinking that ε will be relatively large for the post-Bosman world, but probably less than the infinity assumed in some earlier literature.
will denote the allocation of playing talent to type ) 2 , 1
, also referred to as the 3 Sometimes alternatively referred to as the primitives, characteristics or data of the model. 4 The idea first appears in Madden (2010) .
quality of team in, and is a choice variable for club in; in wt is then the club's expenditure on playing talent, which is the only club cost.
Fan utility
On the output side the owners of club in also make decisions on its price ) ( in p for season tickets that allow entry to all subsequent home games over the season; in the terminology introduced by Fort and Quirk (2011) , the model is that of a "season ticket league". There are disjoint sets of fans of each club in who feel an (exogenously given) affinity to the club and are assumed to be the only potential buyers of its season tickets. Fans of in are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for tickets, denoted . Gate revenues are the only soccer-related club revenues. Notice that under our large stadium capacity and season ticket assumptions, the resulting demand can also be taken to be the attendance at each of the home games of club in.
Remark 1
The specification implies that fan utilities, ticket demands, gate revenues and attendances will all be increasing in both home and away team qualities, stemming from the assumption that ) , ( t t v in is increasing in both its arguments. There is a significant empirical literature on the determinants of soccer attendances -see, for instance, Simmons (2008, 2009) , Buraimo et al. (2009), Forrest and Simmons (2002) , Forrest et al. (2005) . In particular, Buraimo and Simmons (2008, p.151-152) find uniformly positive effects of both home and away team quality on attendance for the EPL, providing empirical support for the assumption that ) , ( t t v in is increasing in both its arguments. It needs to be stressed again that this feature of the model is important, and at variance with many models in the existing literature, which assume that gate revenues (or the more fundamental ticket demand functions or fan utility) depend only on the relative quality of the home team. Madden (2011) provides an extended critique of existing literature in this aspect. In a nutshell it seems completely implausible to assume as a fundamental that gate revenues (or ticket demand or fan utility) are unchanged if all team qualities increase by positive amounts in a way that keeps constant relative team qualities (and hence win percentages and competitive balance). Yet such an assumption is very prevalent in the literature, including Lang et al. (2011) who also address benefactor (sugar-daddy) ownership, with a focus on competitive balance and welfare (as we have here also), and revenue sharing (rather than our FFP). Fan utility (and also owner utility which is a linear combination of profit and win percentage) is homogeneous of degree zero in team qualities, implying (implausibly in this author's view) that uniform expansion of all team qualities (leaving win percentages and competitive balance unchanged) would produce no change in fan (or owner) utility, ticket demand or gate revenue. Later remarks discuss further Lang et al. (2011) .
Owners
Owners of clubs of type i (=1,2) are assumed to have quasi-linear utility functions of the form, for
and with wealthy to provide any fund injection that is optimal for them. In the first term on the right, u is some increasing function of ) , ( t t v in , reflecting the discussion in the introduction of benefactor motivation here -it is a pure, selfish consumption motive that drives any fund injections, its value to the owner dependent on the resulting team qualities in a similar way to that of fan utility. 2 , 1 1 , 0 = ≥ i λ are parameters that allow some heterogeneity between the consumption benefits accruing to the 2 owner types, and are referred to as the owner "generosity" parameters -higher values of i λ indicate greater consumption benefits from ownership which lead (as will be seen) to larger injections.
Given that our motive for fund injection does not entail any explicit need or desire to curry favour with fans, any owner would price tickets at the revenue maximizing (monopoly) level 8 , leading to gate revenue ) , ( t t R in i , as described at the end of the last sub-section. It follows that it would require an injection of
(the negative of profits) to produce a team of quality in t . Because of the large number of clubs in the league, each individual club has no influence over the wage per unit of talent (w) and the average quality of teams ) (t . Under laissez-faire where there are no FFP restrictions on owner injections, the utility maximization problem faced by the owner of club in is;
Because the Cobb-Douglas function satisfies the Inada conditions, any solution to (2.2) when 0
therefore. It is clear that the specification nests the textbook profit maximization objective in the special case where 0 = i λ . It is useful for the model to nest also the other classic textbook objective of win maximization -we can then claim to be generalising beyond the 2 most prevalent club objectives found in previous literature. This requires that the solution to (2.2) always leads to zero profits -the owner will then choose the largest value of in t subject to the budget balance of zero profit, exactly the same as the textbook win-maximizer. The requirement is satisfied only in a special case of (2.2):
Lemma 1 The solution to (2.2) implies always (i.e. for all )
t zero profits, and thus is equivalent to win maximization, if and only if 
is consistent with the increasing returns nature of the specification suggested in Franck (2010, p.117) , following the argument of Rosen (1981 Notice that talent demand will be a decreasing function of w and an increasing function of t . The latter indicates an aggregate strategic complementarity -it is optimal for any owner to increase player expenditure and team quality if other owners do so.
Recalling that (as we already also knew). Thus benefactors choose to inject positive funds into the club, whilst profit-takers do the opposite. At the border between these two owner types, the win maximizer makes zero profit, and chooses to behave like the zero-profit constrained win-maximizer studied in existing models. Finally the profit-maximizer takes out of the club maximum profits. (2.4) reports the usual equation of marginal revenue to the wage in the profit-maximizing case of 0 = i λ where owners derive no consumption benefit from ownership. As i λ increases marginal revenue is augmented by the positive marginal consumption utility the owner now gets from injecting funds (the funds will still be negative for small i λ , becoming positive when i i λ λ> ). In general, (2.4) says that the total marginal benefit, namely the sum of marginal revenue and owner marginal consumption utility, equals the wage.
An interesting feature of the owner utility specification is that it nests the standard objective of win maximization subject to zero profits, and that of profit maximization. Thus the ownership structure of the leagues to be studied in what follows includes a league where both types of club are profit maximizers ( 0 2 1 = = λ λ ), a league where both are win maximizers ( 1 λ and 2 λ at the required critical value), a league where both are benefactors who inject positive funds ( 1 λ and 2 λ sufficiently large), plus all hybrid leagues with mixtures of (and intermediates between) these owner types.
LAISSEZ-FAIRE
This section describes league equilibrium under laissez-faire, and shows how it changes as the benefactor generosity parameters 1 λ and 2 λ vary. The latter comparative statics exercise will facilitate the later analysis of the impact of FFP, which will be seen to be equivalent to certain reductions in 1 λ and 2 λ .
Equilibrium under laissez-faire is a set of (strictly positive) values for the talent allocations to clubs (and so the average league talent level), the wage per unit of talent and season ticket prices such that the talent market clears, all season ticket markets clear and fans and owners are making utility maximizing decisions (about, respectively, ticket demand and talent demand/ticket prices). In equilibrium, all clubs of the same type will make the same decisions, so 
(3.1) ensures utility maximizing owner talent demand (from (2.4)), (3.2) is the talent market clearing condition, and, given utility maximizing ticket demand from fans, (3.3) ensures that owners supply the demand at (owner) utility maximizing prices. It is easy (if cumbersome) to find explicit solutions for unique equilibrium values of all variables. Some are found in the appendix, but for the text we report merely:
Lemma 2 There exists a unique equilibrium under laissez-faire. Proof See appendix.
Turning to comparative statics, consider first equilibrium competitive balance. An indicator of competitive balance is the ratio of team qualities 2 1 / t t , which is, using will have the best quality teams and there will be some competitive imbalance. Thus the bigger fanbase clubs (type 1) may not have the better teams (i.e. 1 t may be lower than 2 t , as found also in Lang et al. (2010) ), if the owners of clubs with the smaller fanbase derive sufficiently large consumption benefits ( 2 λ large enough). Generally, 2 1 / t t is increasing in 1 λ and decreasing in 2 λ , also seen in the contour map for 2 1 / t t in Figure 1 , which allows one to read off the consequences for competitive balance of changes in owner objectives.
Remark 2 For instance, and replicating the comparison of Lang et al. (2010) ; thereafter the increasing generosity of the small club owners means that they now have the better team, competitive balance starts to deteriorate and eventually will become worse than when both clubs were profitmaximizers. The result in Proposition 1 of Lang et al. (2010) is qualitatively the same. Figure 1 shows how comparisons can be made here for pairs of leagues with arbitrary generosity parameters, not just where at least 1 type of club is a profit-maximizer 10 . Figure 1 ), but because talent supply is fixed, i t goes up and j t goes down. From (3.1) with j i = , w must go up, as t is unchanged. Thus an increase in i λ produces an increase in i t , a reduction in j t , and an increase in w, with no change in t . The same will happen if ε is positive but small, except that the small change in the slope of the talent supply curve will now lead to a small increase in t . The reason for the dependence of the switch value of ε on β is as follows. As i λ increases and t increases, the wage increases by an amount which increases (from 0 when ∞ = ε ) as ε declines. The increase in t will increase the marginal benefit (revenue plus consumption, in (2.4)) accruing to type j club owners by amounts which increase with β . For type j owners to increase their talent demand also therefore requires that β is sufficiently large, or, as in (iv) 
The salary of a player in the league will be [the player's individual talent level]× w, and, from (iii), this will increase as i λ increases (if ∞ < ε ), which on any plausible player utility representation will increase the player's utility also.
Consider next the utility of owners. From (2.2) and (3.4)/(3.5), equilibrium owner utility is, for 2 ,
Since an increase in i λ increases both w (at least weakly) and i t , i U also increases. 
), a simple summary statement that now follows is:
Summary statement If talent supply is relatively elastic (
) 2 /( 1 β ε > ), then
an increase in the generosity of at least one owner type leads to increases in all fan and owner utility levels, all season ticket prices and (if
It was seen earlier that increases in the generosity of owners could lead to increases or decreases in competitive balance. It should be stressed that the direction of this change in competitive balance is completely irrelevant for the conclusions of the summary statement and the previous Propositions. For instance, suppose that 1 = i (so that clubs of type i are the big market clubs), and suppose that they also have the more generous owners ( ) 2 1 λ λ > . Then the big market clubs will certainly have the relatively better teams in the laissez-faire equilibrium ( 1 / 2 1 > t t from (3.4)). A further increase now in 1 λ will generate (assuming ) 2 /( 1 β ε > ) the positive effects on team qualities, salaries and utilities noted above, whilst producing (see Figure 1 ) a further increase in 2 1 / t t and a worsening in competitive balance.
Remark 3
The positive welfare impact of increases in owner generosity on fans, owners and players means that just about any plausible concept of aggregate surplus will increase also -any adverse changes to competitive balance are irrelevant, as noted above. In contrast the welfare conclusions of Lang et al. (2011) are naturally quite different. The absence of any effect of absolute quality on fan or owner utility means that the only thing that matters is competitive balance, and the impact on their aggregate surplus concept of introducing sugar daddies into the profit-maximizing league (as discussed in Remark 2 earlier) is more nuanced -certainly it may be negative (see Proposition 2 of Lang et al. (2011)).
FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY
We take FFP to bring into the laissez-faire world the regulation that fund injections cannot be positive. λ ≤ , so neither type of owner is a benefactor and injections are already negative under laissez-faire, then, naturally, the FFP demand that injections are negative has no effect at all, as labelled in ), and fans' utilities always fall. This negative conclusion for FFP in Theorem 1 is reinforced by its adverse impact also on player salaries in (iv). Theorem 2 For a league where the owners of at least one type of club are benefactors, but not too generous benefactors ( i λ is above but close to i λˆ), and where β α ε / > , the impact of FFP will be a reduction in all owner utility levels. Proof See appendix.
Clearly FFP is a bad thing from the welfare viewpoint, at least for a league where the supply of playing talent is relatively elastic. Not only are all consumers (fans) made worse off by the imposition of FFP regulations, but the other interested parties of players and owners are also adversely affected.
FURTHER DISCUSSION
This section offers some further remarks about various aspects of the model and the findings.
The "large league" assumption
The assumption of a large league consisting of large numbers of 2 types of clubs has been adopted to facilitate tractability of the model when talent supply is less than perfectly elastic. However the main points remain for the perfectly elastic talent supply special case if instead one assumes just 2 clubs (a small league). Indeed the first draft of this paper (available on request from the author) explored exactly this type of model; 2 clubs, ∞ = ε but everything else as here. The equilibrium concept is then that of Dietl et al. (2009 ), Lang et al. (2011 ), Madden (2012 , Madden and Robinson (2012) ), a special case of the strategic market game concept suggested for small leagues in Madden (2011) , and the results are qualitatively identical to those found here for the case ∞ = ε
. The desire to bring player salary changes onto the agenda requires generalization of the talent supply assumption, and then the 2 club small league model becomes somewhat intractable because of the talent market power the 2 clubs now have, and the strategic interactions between individual clubs which appear; hence the switch to the current large league setting 11 , where these interactions become negligible and clear results can be derived for the whole range
Whether actual numbers (e.g. 18 in the EPL) are large enough to make the large league model a good approximation is a somewhat moot point. Generally concerns from regulators over market power abuse would not be triggered by such a numbersingle figure numbers are typically needed for this. The view expressed in Madden (2010 Madden ( , 2011 ) is that there is room for both large and small league models in the literature, and the usefulness of the insights generated should be a main criterion for model evaluation. Here the switch to the large league has allowed the additional insights into player salary changes.
Broadcasting
A further simplifying feature of the model is that the only club revenues are gate revenues from ticket sales to fans, plus any benefactor fund injections. In particular there is no broadcasting income, which is nowadays a major revenue source for many clubs, particularly for the EPL from Sky for rights to cover the EPL matches. However it does seem likely that enlarging the model canvas to accommodate broadcasters and their pay-TV audiences will only accentuate the negative welfare conclusions about the impact of FFP that we have reached without them.
Two points come to mind. First, the primary impact of FFP that has been brought to light here is the likely negative effect on team qualities and on the overall league quality. Almost surely this will have a negative welfare affect on the second category of consumers who now enter the picture, namely the pay-TV audiences, who have strong preference for the quality aspect (see Forrest et al. (2005) ). But, secondly, this in turn is likely to have a negative knock-on affect on the willingness of broadcasters to bid for the league's TV coverage rights, which in turn will further reduce club revenues, and the overall league quality will again spiral down. Both these negative affects are detailed in Madden and Pezzino (2011) , whose focus is broadcaster regulation, rather than the FFP regulation of clubs. If the UK authorities did impose FFP on the EPL, the uniform negative welfare consequences for fans, players and owners reported earlier may well be magnified by the broadcasting dimension, and spread to pay-TV audiences as well as the audiences of stadium fans.
Relatively inelastic talent supply
The paper has suggested that the assumption of a relatively elastic supply of talent to a European soccer league such as the EPL is a natural one, post-Bosman. In defence, some casual remarks are that the EPL has enjoyed an influx of non-gate revenue in the last two decades, not only from benefactors but also from pay-TV broadcasters. During the 1990s the influx led to the arrival in the EPL of many high quality players from elsewhere in Europe, and from the rest of the world (large increase in " " 2 1 t t + ) with some wage inflation (increase in " "w ), and perhaps a relatively high elasticity. But it also seems that the rate of change of aggregate quality with respect to wage changes may have abated somewhat recently, i.e. talent supply to the EPL may have become more inelastic. This is no more than a casual conjecture stemming from two observations. First, by now, the EPL is already home to many of the world's best players, and attempts by benefactors to increase their team quality may be leading more to redistribution of talent within the EPL, rather than player import from abroad. Secondly, there does seem to be a particularly high level of recent and ongoing wage inflation in the EPL. Together these observations point towards relatively small changes in " " 2 1 t t + recently being associated with relatively large changes in " "w , perhaps indicating a relatively inelastic talent supply of late.
These observations flag up the question of the theoretical consequences of relatively inelastic talent supply: does negation of the previous relatively elastic talent supply assumption rescue FFP from the uniformly negative welfare consequences in Theorems 1 and 2? The answer is yes, to an extent, since there will be some winners now, as opposed to the uniform losers before. But, critically, the consequences for consumers (the usual regulator focus) may still be uniformly negative.
Note first that, from Proposition 4(i) and Lemma 3 and for any 0 > ε , FFP will always reduce t and so (if ∞ < ε ) players will be worse off. Also, since the reduction in t implies that at least one of 1 t or 2 t must fall, at least one set of fans is always made worse off by FFP. A nice special case (details omitted) shows how both sets of fans may still be made worse even at low ε , and the only winners are owners.
Suppose that 0 > ε but small, and that both owner types are benefactors with generosity parameters that are proportional to fanbase . Then FFP has no effect on the laissez-faire relative team qualities (and hence on competitive balance), but causes absolute team qualities to decline proportionately (a little), bringing about a reduction in season ticket prices and a (relatively large) fall in the wage. But, exactly as before, the fall in ticket prices fails to compensate fans for the drop in quality, and all fans suffer a utility loss, accompanied by a continuing negative effect on player salaries. The only winners here are the owners. Because of the relative inelasticity of talent supply and the strategic complementarity, owners under laissez-faire end up paying large sums to increase team quality only a littlethey are engaged in what a number of authors have referred to as a "rat-race". FFP frees them from this expenditure spiral, producing only a relatively small drop in quality (with no change in competitive balance), which leaves owners better off, but not of course the players or fans. It is then perhaps not surprising that support for FFP has been expressed by benefactor owners in the EPL of both big clubs (Roman Abramovich at Chelsea) and small clubs (Dave Whelan at Wigan Athletic), and that the vast majority of the larger European clubs (in ECA) voted for UEFA's adoption of FFP.
Empirical issues
The theoretical model has made a number of simplifying assumptions in order to provide an integrated, coherent argument regarding FFP. However 2 particular assumptions are central to the paper, and lend themselves to empirical investigation. The first has already been indicated in the previous sub-section and spawns the question: what is a reasonable value of the elasticity of talent supply to the EPL, and how has it changed over the last 20 years? Although some anecdotal pointers were provided, there does seem to be a lack of any serious scientific estimates. It is clear from our findings that this elasticity is important, the strongly negative conclusions regarding FFP following if it is high, with more nuanced conclusions otherwise. The second central assumption is that fan utility, and the implied ticket demand and gate revenues, are increasing in both home and away team qualities. This too is important here in that the effects of absolute team qualities on fan utilities dominate the fan welfare evaluations, changes in relative qualities and competitive balance being irrelevant. There is scientific evidence in favour of this second assumption, in the cited Buraimo and Simmons (2008) , but further confirmation of their findings would be valuable.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has provided a novel model of owner objectives in a sports league, encompassing the standard profit and win maximizers, and bringing in benefactors who inject their own funds to enhance team quality. The motivation assumed to be behind the benefactor behaviour is a pure consumption motive, its value depending on the quality of the team and the league, analogous maybe to race-horse ownership. Benefactors seem to be present in European soccer, especially the EPL, but UEFA's recently published FFP regulations aim to preclude positive benefactor fund injections for the direct enhancement of team quality (by payment of salaries or transfer fees). Although the FFP regulations do not preclude a benefactor meeting costs associated with longer-run investments, such as youth development, tangible fixed assets, and so on, they will preclude the direct team quality enhancements that are our focus. For UEFA the regulations will shortly become a pre-condition of entry to its European level club competitions, and it has been suggested that FFP might be adopted by the EPL, forcing all its clubs to comply. Assuming talent supply is relatively elastic (given the fierce inter-league competition for players in European soccer), the model shows that such a regulation will lead to a reduction in all team qualities, and this will lead to a Pareto disimprovement for all fans of the league, as well as a fall in owner utilities and player wages.
Although a relatively inelastic talent supply to the league softens the extreme negativity of these conclusions, it may easily remain the case that all fans and players are made worse off by FFP, with only owners gaining. Whilst this suggests how a regulation like FFP might come to be adopted in a world where clubs have political power, there is still nothing here to recommend that FFP should be adopted, in particular against the usual consumer surplus criterion, either in the context of an individual league or in UEFA's pan-European context.
If there is a sound case in economic theory for FFP as a regulatory device, it seems to me that such a case remains to be made. 
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